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Abstract 
 
 
This dissertation aimed to assess the impact of innovative smart market solutions and 
Blockchain technology on achieving efficient localized energy markets. Trends suggest the 
future of renewable energy generation will involve a move away from centralized power plants, 
and towards a large number of smaller generation units, such as PV cells. There are clear 
synergies between the market dynamics of photovoltaic systems and Blockchain-enabled smart 
markets, which can be harnessed towards integrating new consumption patterns and energy 
sources, as well as connecting consumers. Successful business strategy to integrate these 
technologies can lead to market leadership in this new industry. Captivating consumers is a 
key determinant of success, and offering lower electricity prices a necessary condition.  For 
such offering to be feasible, markets need to be more efficient, as smart microgrids are proving 
to be.  
Consequently, there came the interest to see how new local electricity markets could be 
set up, while taking advantage of decentralization. A peer-to-peer, auction-based, local energy 
market was idealized and various simulations of were ran with differing levels of participants 
and structure, to understand the impact on the price of electricity achieved by the market. 
Market size and structure were both shown to affect price at different magnitudes, suggesting 
an ideal setup of 25-40 participants with generation capabilities over 60% of demand. Further 
analysis was undertaken to understand the impact of smart meters and Blockchain integration 
in such a market. Afterwards, conclusions were compiled and recommendations provided for 
how to approach new practical implementations.  
 
 
Esta dissertação teve como objetivo avaliar o impacto de inovadoras soluções de 
mercados inteligentes e tecnologia Blockchain em mercados locais de energia. Tendencias 
apontam para que o futuro das energias renovaveis passe por uma maior prevalencia de paineis 
fotovoltaicos domesticos. As sinergias entre as atuais dinamicas em mercados eletricos e o uso 
da Blockchain em mercados inteligentes parecem claras, podendo ser aproveitaveis para 
integrar novos perfis de consumo e conectar consumidores. Sendo um novo segmento, 
estratégias de mercado bem conseguidas serão essencias para ganhar posição, e a capacidade 
de angariar consumidores será um indicador crucial de sucesso. Para tal, os mercados têm que 
ser mais eficientes, algo que se tem revelado factual em casos de micro sistemas. 
 Assim, criou-se o interesse de perceber como desenhar e implementar mercados 
localizados de energia que beneficiem desta tendencia de desintermediação. Para tal, um 
mercado interativo à base de leilões de eletricidade entre consumidores foi idealizado. 
Posteriormente, este foi simulado repetidamente, com diferentes  dimensões e estruturas, a fim 
de perceber o seu impacto nos preços médios alcançados. Foi mostrado que tamanho e 
composição afetam os preços em magnitudes diferentes, sugerindo uma dimensão ideal de 25-
40 participantes, com capacidades de autogeração superiores a 60%. Análises posteriors foram 
desenvolvidas de modo substantive, para avaliar o impacto de contadores eletricos inteligentes 
e integração da Blockchain neste tipo de mercado. Finalmente, conclusões foram reunidas e 
transformadas em recomendações para futuras implementações práticas. 
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1: INTRODUCTION 
The following section offers a brief introductory contextualization of the topic and 
formulates the case study to be posteriorly analyzed. Additionally, the research goal and 
process are described, culminating with insights into how such research is significant and 
contributes to the overall body of literature on the topic. 
 
1.1 MOTIVATION 
“Climate change is destroying our path to sustainability. Ours is a world of looming 
challenges and increasingly limited resources. Sustainable development offers the best chance 
to adjust our course.” (Ban Ki-moon, 2012). 
 Development of new sustainable approaches to business management in a way that 
generates economic and social progress has become a crucial point of focus around the world.  
However, while the importance of environmental conditions and mitigation of climate change 
have also gained increased notoriety, infrastructural change is often slow. Fossil energy, 
including coal, oil and natural gas still accounts for over 80% of global energy consumption 
(WorldBank, 2015a). Large environmental impacts have also become more notorious in recent 
years, contributing to higher levels of awareness towards the need for wider use of renewable 
energy sources(RES).  
Countries and organizations have defined targets for low carbon growth, notably the 2015 
Paris agreement whereby members of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change set the goal of keeping average global warming below 2 degrees Celsius, or a legally 
binding EU target according to which 20% of the total energy consumption of the EU must 
come from renewable sources (Tampakis et al., 2013). Another encouraging indicator is that 
various developing countries are currently setting the standard in terms of production and 
installation of RES.  
The U.S Energy Information Administration (EIA) identifies renewables as the world’s 
fastest-growing energy source, with consumption predicted to increase, on average, 2.3% each 
year between 2015 and 2040. This catch-all definition of renewables includes solar, maritime, 
hydro, wind, geothermal and bioenergy sources. Worldwide, these sources currently account 
for approximately 19% of total final energy consumption (WorldBank, 2015b). Solar energy 
generation systems have received a greater deal of attention lately, with total installed solar 
generation capacity exponentially increasing from 38.4 gigawatts in 2010 to a projected 306.3 
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gigawatts in 2017 (U.S. EIA, 2017). Figure 1 highlights the evolution of worldwide PV 
installed capacity. As for electricity generation from solar energy, 315.5 billion kWh are 
predicted to be generated in 2017, up from 32.9 billion kWh in 2010.  
 
 
However, various problems have begun to become, as handicaps in the systems become 
more serious as the number of users increases. In that sense, expectations are increasingly 
placed on Blockchain as a driver of this energy revolution and enabler of various new systems 
of grid interaction. By acting as a secure and tamper-proof digital record of transactions 
through a decentralized system of Peer-to-Peer (P2P) interactions, it results in an immutable 
decentralized ledger that increases transparency and enables various automation mechanisms 
through the use of smart meters and contracts, which can be coded for virtually any goal. 
The energy sector has been innovative in its experimentation of Blockchain integration and 
creation of diverse pilot projects. Trading platforms for agents in wholesale markets have been 
gaining steam lately (PONTON, 2017). Platforms focused on setting up the infrastructure to 
allow machine to machine communication and control through the development of smart 
homes have also gained notoriety (Jarvenpaa et al., 2016).  Perhaps the most futuristic concept, 
the P2P trading concept (Mengelkamp et al., 2017) gives prosumers the power to allocate their 
resources and energy usage according to market mechanisms. These systems enable automatic 
trading of electricity not only between individual prosumers but also with the grid. The current 
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Figure 1  – Cumulative Worldwide Installed Generation Capacity (source: adapted from Ren21 GSR 2017)
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promise of Blockchain, the widespread possibility of applications and uses it offers, is also its 
current main barrier to development, as more questions are created than answered. There is a 
wide scope of proposed and implemented solutions and business models, however most are 
tailored to individual needs and specific use cases and rarely scalable. The energy sector 
appears poised to suffer radical changes and therefore emerges as a very interesting case study. 
 
1.2 RESEARCH GOAL 
As Blockchain technology matures and further real-world applications are tested, it is 
expected that more in-depth research will be conducted on the transition towards decentralized 
energy markets and its enabling factors. This study seeks to assist the interconnection of smart 
homes, electricity markets and Blockchain-solutions in the context of local electricity markets. 
A Monte Carlo simulation of an idealized market mechanism will be assessed in differing 
settings of size and household profiles with the objective of measuring the impact of different 
setups on overall equilibrium price of electricity within the market. As such, there will be an 
analysis of methods to increase local energy market efficiency and foster quicker widespread 
adoption of such mechanisms by boosting the incentives for new adopters through lower 
electricity prices.  
Research conducted throughout also aims to help address some gaps in the literature 
regarding Blockchain technology, focusing on its usage as a tool to automate smart markets. A 
conceptual use case in the shape of a P2P local energy market will be proposed as a starting 
point. While the technological development of average households through installation of 
smart meters and connection to Blockchain-enabled markets presents a great deal of 
advantages, there are also various types of costs, which will be evaluated. As such, the central 
research question of this study will be: 
Which opportunities arise for the energy industry through the rise of Blockchain technology, 
IOT and prosumers and what is the impact on the business case for local energy markets? 
Several findings will stem from this research. Firstly, an optimal market dimension will 
be evaluated based on the electricity prices resulting from simulations with different 
households and market sizes. Moreover, an optimal market structure will be suggested, based 
on the simulation setups that achieve higher levels of market efficiency. Subsequently, 
Blockchain tools will be evaluated on their ability to automate market function and enable 
automatic supply and demand matching. Given the high degree of complexity of energy 
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networks and grids, associated with high variance of emission factors, this study will be 
focused on final energy demands, rather than their environmental impacts. Figure 2, below, 
summarizes the research flow. 
 
 
 
 
1.3 ACADEMIC AND PRACTICAL RELEVANCE 
The methodological use of a Monte Carlo simulation leads to results which can be 
generalized to larger segments of population, outside of the ones considered in this study. That 
benefit is two-fold, as the achieved results will be of significance to various stakeholders in the 
sector and can therefore be used as a starting point for more in-depth studies into the topic. 
On a second level, the analysis of decentralized market mechanisms involves a critical look 
into the current roles of various players in the sector and posterior discussion of their relevance 
and contributions. The need for intermediaries is greatly reduced in the proposed market setup, 
which helps combat excessive management costs, reduce inefficiencies and save time. 
Therefore, it is of the utmost importance to understand the impact of technological advances 
on household management and market functioning, analyzing them not only from a theoretical 
basis but also in terms of utility and associated efficiency gains. It is expected that as prevalence 
of these management tools proliferates, decentralized markets will become increasingly more 
efficient and cost-effective. As such, the disruptive potential of said decentralization should 
become clear, as it is predicted to lead to vastly altered service offerings and value propositions. 
These insights result therefore in various contributions to academia and further research 
developed in the future. Current literature on Blockchain technology is still vague and the 
reader is faced with a multitude of different analyses and points of focus. Therefore, this thesis 
Figure 2 - Summarized Research Flow
 9 
 
has the first focus of adding context and facilitating the comprehension of what a Blockchain 
actually is. As for Blockchain uses in the RE sector, literature on the topic is predictably even 
more scarce and focused on a limited number of scenarios. As such, this paper also intends to 
help bridge the gap between basic understanding of Blockchain technology and practical 
implementations in the sector. Lastly, the elaboration of a comprehensive use case in the shape 
of an idealized market mechanism should offer added insights into various possible setups and 
associated strategical trade-offs. 
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2: LITERATURE REVIEW 
This chapter reviews the existing literature on the changing dynamics of RE markets 
and the possibilities created through the incorporation of Blockchain technology.  Since this 
specific topic is relatively new and under-researched, a comprehensive literature review took 
place as a starting point to address the research question.  It has been divided into 3 major 
topics, which ultimately have an overarching impact on the challenges faced in the field. 
Firstly, it will examine the changing consumption patterns of average consumers, 
looking at enabling factors, current management mechanisms and barriers to be overcome. 
Such insights will help understand the motives and processes through which grid interactions 
are changing, arriving at the concept of microgrids and local energy markets (LEM). A strategic 
analysis of market design and platform development are also included. A second level of 
analysis will be focused on Blockchain technology, going from simple analysis into the concept 
and function of this innovation to a more in-depth look into how its potential can be harnessed 
in the scope of local renewable energy markets. Lastly, the previous two points will be allied 
with new technological breakthroughs, enabling further research into the efficiency and price 
constraints of localized electricity exchanges. Such research will then allow for a clearer picture 
of strong and weak points of existing projects and setups in the field and help derive general 
conclusions for how new local markets should be set up and variables to account for. 
Simultaneously, a comprehensive set of hypotheses to be tested will be presented throughout 
the section, culminating with a conceptual model of market organization and functioning. 
 
2.1 RENEWABLE ENERGY AND MARKET DESIGN 
Firstly, there came the need to understand the RE market at a global level and the shifts 
in preferences displayed by consumers. Building upon this knowledge, a brief overview into 
market design and platform strategies will be used as the starting point for platform ideation. 
 
2.1.1 Current Trends in Photovoltaic Systems 
Solar energy generation involves the use of the sun’s energy to provide hot water via 
solar  thermal systems or electricity via photovoltaic (PV) and concentrating solar power (CSP) 
systems (Ellabban et al., 2014). The cost of producing solar energy through PV systems has 
been decreasing in the past few years, as knowledge increases and economies of scale and 
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scope come into play. Currently, domestic PV systems can achieve costs of 10 cents per kWh, 
with large scale infrastructures going as low as 4 cents per kWh (Jones-Albertus et al., 2016). 
This represents a massive improvement from the average costs of 20 cents per kWh just ten 
years ago (Breu et al., 2008), enabling PV systems to rival and even outperform the consumer 
costs of utility power around parts of the developed world. Figure 3 details the trends for 
installed production in terms of price per Watt. 
 
 
 
 
Households are a key part of this progression towards renewables, representing 25% of 
final energy consumption (Eurostat, 2017a). The increasingly similar prices between domestic 
PV and utilities (Timilsina et al., 2012), due to rising electricity costs (Eurostat, 2017b), appear 
to drive transformations in the energy system. The scalability of PV technology and 
installations, consequent cost reductions (Delucchi & Jacobson, 2011), increased citizen 
awareness and interest in the sector(Rai & Robinson, 2015) also play a significant role. 
 
2.1.2 Prosumers and Market Management 
As domestic generation prices decrease (Karakaya et al., 2015), the concept of the 
prosumer becomes a central point when analyzing how consumers interact with the grid and 
traditional stakeholders. Alvin Toffler (1980) is considered to be the creator of the term 
“prosumer”, dedicating extensive attention to it in The Third Wave. While there is not a single 
catch-all definition, prosumers are considered to be “those who are simultaneously involved in 
Figure 3  – Installed PV Price per Watt with 2015 base (source: BerkeleyLab, 2016)
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both production and consumption” (Ritzer, 2010). In the context of RE markets and in the 
interest of clarity, a prosumer will be considered a consumer who also produces some of his 
electricity (Masson et al., 2014), resulting in different socio-economic incentives and a 
systemically different relationship to the grid.   
Various approaches regarding grid interactions have been tested, as a method for 
aggregating prosumers and guiding their relationships to each other and the grid. By design, 
these models also attempt to encourage the installation of domestic PV systems by offering 
favorable pricing schemes. The most common mechanisms are net metering, net purchase and 
sale and feed-in-tariffs (FiTs). All three have some particularities that influence the overall 
levels of welfare created and prices achieved (Yamamoto, 2012) and there is no single, clear-
cut best mechanism.  
Recent studies (Eid et al., 2014) highlighted that high renewables penetration can create 
uncertainty regarding savings from the installation of residential PV. Darghouth, Barbose & 
Wiser (2014) identified 3 main sources for such uncertainty:  
 Electricity market development can lead to changes in retail electricity pricing (Bohne, 
2011); 
 Retail rate structures available to prosumers are generally benefic (Ossenbrink, 2017) 
as a way to boost adoption, but that could change as market penetration increases; 
 Shift away from net-metering and towards other compensation mechanisms. 
This line of reasoning leads to what is currently the biggest barrier to wider adoption, the 
individual nature of energy management (Karnouskos, 2011), as each node is disconnected and 
lacks the capabilities to cooperate with other nodes. This issue arises from the difficulty of 
load-matching, since periods when energy generation is highest rarely coincide with those of 
major energy usage. This results in inefficiencies in energy systems (Widén et al., 2009), as 
production is usually too high during base-load and insufficient during peak-load.  
 
2.1.3 Smart Microgrids 
Microgrids have been developed as an economically viable alternative (Mahmoud et 
al., 2014) to reliably supply energy to end-consumers (Watson et al., 2006). One of their main 
advantages is additional flexibility resulting from two possible operational modes (Asmus, 
2010), a grid-connected one and an autonomous mode that is decoupled from the grid (Su & 
Wang, 2012). Further research (Huang et al., 2011; Olivares et al., 2014) lead to the analysis 
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of 5 deployment modes, with this study focusing on “household” and “community” modes, 
which are characterized by smaller network sizes and arise from a general desire for cost-
savings, self-reliance (Walker & Cass, 2007) and reduced dependence on utilities. 
Further technological advances enabled the creation of smartgrids, highly complex 
ecosystems of heterogeneous entities which interact to achieve a certain functionality (Bichler 
et al., 2010). More in-depth, they are essentially optimization-based mechanisms which make 
use of computational power to follow constraints and optimize outcomes (MacKie-Mason & 
Wellman, 2006, ch. 18). Ideally, smart grids are in automated in some form, to decrease 
decision times and ensure immediate availability of resources. In that sense, they are expected 
to limit human interaction by automatically analyzing and responding to network changes 
(Wang et al., 2011) in short time frames. This feature appears to be key, as creation of markets 
where users interact based on their self-interest raises the issues of trust and accuracy 
(Vytelingum et al., 2010), be it in meter data reporting or electricity transactions.  
However, due to their design, current iterations of smartgrids require a minimum 
number of consumers to be economically viable (Kriett & Salani, 2012), meaning that 
scalability concerns are still present. This last condition has prompted a variety of different 
research approaches into how to make microgrids more appealing to prosumers, through a 
combination of financial, legal and social measures. In that sense, ensuring that microgrids 
provide lower levels of electricity costs than those offered by the grid seems to be the first 
required step. 
 
2.1.4 Market Design 
In such an innovative and fast-evolving industry segment, market design will become 
a crucial determinant of success. Use of market design principles is broadly defined as 
examining “the reasons why markets institutions fail and considers the properties of alternative 
mechanisms, in terms of efficiency, fairness, incentives, and complexity” (National Bureau of 
Economic Research, 2013).  This concept has been studied and applied across a multitude of 
markets, notably in the case of electricity auctions (Wilson, 2002), (Liu et al., 2010). 
In more practical, management-applicable terms, the focus on market design brought 
about three key dimensions to consider when developing effective markets and allocation 
systems (Agrawal et al., 2015). The first consideration is market thickness, that is, whether 
there are sufficient participants willing to take part in market functioning at a given time and 
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complete transactions between each other. The second point of focus is market congestion, or 
a lack thereof. In essence, this means guaranteeing that participants are allowed to consider 
enough alternatives before choosing the one that is ideal for them. This process is mainly 
ensured through structuring of auction and transaction processes (Akbarpour et al., 2014). 
Lastly, market participation should be safe and simple when compared to the alternative of 
transacting outside the marketplace or engaging in strategic behavior that reduces the overall 
utility attainable inside the market. To appropriately fulfill these requirements, another concept 
of relevance is the creation of platform strategies.  
 
2.1.5 Platform Strategies 
Platform strategies are focused on establishing network effects, in that they revolve 
around allowing platform participants to benefit from the presence of others (Pisano, 2015). 
Naturally, such a distinct structure requires the use of alternate tools and frameworks to 
understand how to create and capture value. Ideation of a platform strategy is generally 
composed of three distinct steps. The first is identifying the distinct sources of platform value 
and developing a plan for value creation and capture. After such a process, the emphasis is on 
creation of the actual platform in a market where none existed, defined throughout literature as 
“coring the platform”. Lastly, there is the tipping step, where the focus is on growing the 
platform by levering the advantages provided by early market entrance. 
Only when all three of these steps have been undertaken and jointly considered, can a 
platform leadership strategy appear (Van Alstyne et al., 2016). When applying this strategy, a 
firm intends to position its product offering as the foundation upon which other products and 
processes are designed around, leading to an institutional evolution (Bohnsack et al., 2015) 
This creation of an ecosystem around a product offering is not simple, but most successful 
companies have followed some common principles: 
- Development of technology that is somewhat open, meaning that others can adapt 
the current offering and independently develop additional applications. 
- Modular-built technology, where specific parts can be modified independently. This 
allows for development to go in a direction not planned in original usage. 
- Mechanisms to bring parties together to achieve a common goal or solve a 
generalized problem. 
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When successful, companies are able to exert influence over the direction of innovation 
inside their industry, further increasing their importance relative to competitors and providers 
of complementary services. But becoming a platform leader is not possible to all and nor can 
all industries create platform leaders. The value proposition is maximized under specific 
conditions, the fundamental one being that the offered product has limited value when used 
alone but gains value when used along with other complements. When combined with 
complementary innovation, platform leadership makes it possible to create scenarios that 
present a win-win situation for the platform leader, complementary manufacturers and 
customers. 
As such, models and trading systems should be built in a way that ensure all users 
benefit from added utility resultant from lower net spending in electricity. Development and 
use of an auction mechanism for electricity transactions appears to be a viable choice towards 
increasing overall market efficiency. This stems from the fact that competitive bidding between 
users with a profit-maximizing behavior invariably leads the market towards long-run 
efficiency (Cramton, 2004). To quantify such an impact, there came the need to test the added 
overall utility enabled by the creation of a local energy market, by looking at possible price 
targets. A look into existing literature provided an answer, in the shape of predictive 
simulations (Mengelkamp et al., 2017) and posterior comparison of achieved equilibrium 
prices. 
A more complete look into this condition and resulting conclusions will be undertaken 
in later sections, but the main consideration for now is the direct implied relation between lower 
achieved equilibrium price and business case feasibility. Such a condition will be the focal 
point of this study, and the business case will be evaluated on the likelihood of achieving 
equilibrium prices in the LEM that are lower than those provided by the applicable central 
distribution agent. 
For now, the proposed mechanism will be looked at through a market coring 
perspective. This framework intends to firmly place the platform at the center of an ecosystem, 
where consumers and prosumers meet, make connections and transactions (Toppenberg et al., 
2016). Given the present context, the posterior focus will be the creation of value through the 
offering of lower electricity prices than current systems and grid interactions allow. A further 
narrowing of scope will be undertaken subsequently. As such, the key questions to answer are 
identified in Table 1. 
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While all the previous points are of the utmost importance, an in-depth analysis into all of them 
would stretch beyond the scope of this study. Therefore, the focus will be the on the What and 
Why portions. Naturally, the remaining questions were considered in a more general 
perspective as the basis for the ideation of an effective and efficient platform. Table 2, below, 
highlights the main features and functionality of the proposed platform. 
 
 
 
 
2.2 BLOCKCHAIN 
Arguably the biggest technological advancement of the past decade, the Blockchain 
was created by a person or group of people only known by the pseudonym Satoshi Nakamoto, 
a “purely peer-to-peer version of electronic cash”, as he put it in a paper published in 2008. 
 
2.2.1 Blockchain Value Proposition 
Ideated by Namakoto to be the public ledger for bitcoin transactions, it is the technology 
that enables moving Bitcoin from one person to another, essentially allowing digital 
information to be distributed but not copied or tampered with. A multitude of use cases and 
Key Questions Description
Who? Platform positioning
What & Why? Core functionality and value offering
How? Governance and rules
Who pays? How much? Pricing schemes and consumer segments
Table 1 - Market Coring Analysis
Functionality and Features
Local electricity transactions
Access to electricity at lower rates
Connection to other consumers and prosumers
Smart meter integration
Grid-backed stability and reliability
Payment platform
Promotion of sustainability
Instant
Secure
Simple online interface
Individual forecasting
Table 2 - Proposed Platform Functionality and Features
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potential applications for this technology are currently being developed, ranging from 
cryptocurrency trading to smart contracts and store of records. Blockchain offers a cheap and 
reliable method to record financial and operational transactions, making it a plausible 
alternative to eventually replace part of the utilities’ business by removing the need for a middle 
man.  
In the context of renewables and microgrids, it has the potential to enable a fully 
integrated trading system that enables participants to trade excess production and load-match 
more efficiently. However, in the short term, the expected impact is lower, with Blockchain 
being incorporated as part of the system, rather than as a disruptive innovation. Significant 
barriers are still prevalent, as Blockchain is largely untested in the RE markets. Gradual 
development and success cases will be crucial for the establishment of Blockchain models as 
an integrating part of any smart city grid planning model. On one hand, applications are still 
somewhat niche-based and localized, leaving the average consumer still uninformed about the 
possible applications of Blockchain in this industry. Furthermore, government-backed 
initiatives and incentive models, as well as regulators and current incumbents, will demand 
clearer applications and well-designed use-cases, to ensure that the benefits outweigh potential 
costs and the inevitable uncertainty that will need to be navigated. Lastly, industry standards 
will have to be developed, facilitating the integration between various utilities and geographical 
locations, which currently act as somewhat isolated nodes in the scenarios where prosumer 
movements are more evolved. Nevertheless, if Blockchain proves itself capable of scaling to 
meet market demands, it will usher in an era of a “distributed world”, where large and small 
power-generation systems coexist and interact efficiently (Basden & Cottrell, 2017).  
 
2.2.2 Blockchain Architecture 
“The Blockchain is an incorruptible digital ledger of economic transactions that can be 
programmed to record not just financial transactions but virtually everything of value.” 
(Blockgeeks, 2016). 
Information present on the Blockchain exists as a shared, decentralized, continuously 
updated database. Data is not stored in any single physical location, the records are public and 
easily verifiable, being hosted by millions of computers worldwide, so anyone with an internet 
connection can check this database and any transaction at will. The main technological 
breakthrough of such a system is that it circumvents the current need for a bank or any other 
central entity to act as a trusted middleman and moderate transactions. This shared record book, 
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or distributed ledger, is copied thousands of times and stored across the globe, making it truly 
decentralized. Additionally, it is immutable, meaning that it is irreversible, so that each data 
entry exists in perpetuity and can be checked by everyone, but altered by no one. To do so, it 
relies on public consensus, meaning that if any entity tries to dishonestly change it, the many 
computers involved in the verification process would reject such a change. 
 
 
 
 
When two parties intend to complete a transaction, it needs to be validated, which is 
done by miners, people who hold the ledger in their computers. To add the validated transaction 
to the ledger, the miners compete to find a key through the use of computational power and time 
where the first one to guess the correct answer is the winning a financial reward, in this case a percentage 
of a digital coin. Figure 4 presents a simplified visual representation of how a transaction is processed 
through Blockchain. 
 
2.2.3 Smart Devices and the Internet of Things 
In this chapter, the focus will be on analyzing the necessary technologies to bring these 
projects to life and allow them to scale, as well as understanding how they all work together. 
Smart Meters: Although smart meters themselves are not exactly new technology, with 
the first iterations having been first proposed in the 1970s, they are an integral part of any 
microgrid managing system. In essence, such a device records consumption of electric energy 
Figure 4  – Blockchain Transaction Process (source: Blockgeeks, 2016)
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in pre-set intervals and communicates this data to utilities, having been proved to help reduce 
electricity expenses by, on average, 3% to 5% (McKerracher & Torriti, 2013).  The real 
innovation comes from the added ability for these meters to handle fluctuations in electricity 
supply and demand automatically and in real-time, by actively monitoring consumption 
(Muralitharan et al., 2016), which massively helps with the issue of load-matching and opens 
the door for the creation of P2P markets. This combination of features essentially enables 
microgrids to constantly adapt to outside conditions and the number of participants in the 
system.  
Smart Contracts: Smart contracts on the Blockchain help bring this dis-intermediate 
system to life by avoiding issues in communication and flow of energy (Omohundro, 2014) 
thanks to the accurate, transparent and automatic system it is based on. The difference between 
such a technology and a traditional contract is that while both define the rules and penalties 
around an agreement, the smart contract automatically enforces these obligations for all 
involved parties.  
The Internet of Things (IoT) is also a central concept to this analysis, as connecting a 
multitude of devices over the internet has proven to be a challenging concept (Spanò et al., 
2015), with various barriers. In essence, it aims to develop a system where “physical items are 
enriched with embedded electronics…and connected to the Internet” (Shrouf et al., 2014). It 
is, however, essential to create a such a grid of connections to ensure proper management and 
operation of smart meters. The Ethereum Blockchain can be used to manage IoT devices (Huh 
et al., 2017), by using smart contracts to define their behavior and coordinate their interactions, 
allowing them to actively participate in business processes. 
Integration of Multiple Microgrids: By relying on such an automated and standardized 
system, the use of the same Blockchain protocol across various microgrids opens the possibility 
for features such as demand response mechanisms and capacity reserve markets to be 
incorporated on a larger scale, effectively integrating smaller microgrids into a larger 
ecosystem of similarly-minded prosumers. 
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2.3 LOCAL ENERGY MARKET MANAGEMENT 
The following section will be focused on the changing dynamics of LEM, which has 
been boosted by rapidly evolving technological advances. In discussing these concepts, the 
scope of this study will be narrowed further by incorporating previously discussed topics into 
the analysis of localized markets and prosumer interactions. A comprehensive set of 
hypotheses will be created and posteriorly tested analytically. 
 
2.3.1 Local Energy Markets  
Local energy markets are a decentralized approach that allow both consumers and 
prosumers to locally trade renewable-generated electricity. In essence, LEM help maintain a 
closer balance of supply and demand of electricity in the community, by offering real-time 
pricing. The European Commission (EC, 2016) defined LEM as “decentralized, smart and 
interconnected markets”, as they assist domestic energy consumers and prosumers in benefiting 
from additional flexibility when choosing their energy supply. The creation of such a market 
mechanism allows connected agents to trade energy with their community, virtually 
(Lamparter, Becher, & Fischer, 2010). One of the main aims of the establishment of such a 
marketplace is the reduction of electricity costs for all participants.  By having a limited 
participant base, data-driven processes should become more efficient over time (Wolske et al., 
2017), as increasing levels of automation should lead to optimal allocation of electricity. In 
ideal cases, a cycle of positive reinforcement (Mengelkamp et al., 2017) is created, with the 
resulting savings in electricity funneled into additional investment in RES, which will once 
again lead to lower energy prices for the entire community. 
In this sense, it becomes necessary to consider two separate theories: Firstly, the Theory 
of Disintermediation for electronic markets (Chaffey, 2009), which argues that decentralization 
movements lead to a wide array of cost decreases. The second theory to consider is the 
Technology Acceptance mode (Surendran, 2012), which defends that perceived ease of use has 
a strong influence on perceived usefulness. As such, it seems important to consider this model 
when analyzing software utilization and its link to user performance (Dishaw & Strong, 1999). 
Therefore, smart meter usage and overall LEM functioning should require a lower level of 
human input than currently verifiable while, at the same time, providing easy to use interfaces 
and result-tracking mechanisms. 
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2.3.2 Blockchain-Powered Energy Markets 
The first implementation of energy markets making use of Blockchain technology was 
proposed in 2014. Ever since, extensive amounts of research have gone into energy markets 
and its various interdependent systems but the current lack of scaled implementations of 
microgrids across the globe shows that cost-effective models are still rare or inexistent. 
Nevertheless, the combination of several new technologies presented above can be used to 
derive new models, using distributed microgrids that enable peer-to-peer (P2P) energy trading 
through a Blockchain ledger. In that sense, an analysis of current business models, however 
localized, may provide significant inputs to help understand how to surpass the challenges of 
creating a standardized mechanism, selling the system and overcoming financing woes. Based 
on the review set out by Zhang, Wu, Long and Cheng (2017), the most significant projects in 
the field were identified and briefly compared. A summarized comparison of the different 
projects can be found on Table 3.  
 
 
 
Most projects share common characteristics and can be organized into structured 
clusters. Piclo, Vandenbron and SonnenCommunity are all regional or national-level platforms 
that enable P2P energy trading among members and take user of a central entity acting as a 
supplier. However, these are focused on the strict development of business models and appear 
incompatible with smaller scale markets.  On another hand, projects such as SmartWatts and 
Project Country Start year Goals Scale Layers Results
Ulink US 2014
Provide electricity 
access through 
microgrids
Microgrids
Energy 
Network
Standardized 
development of 
microgrids
Transactive Grid US 2015
Microgrid energy 
trading using 
Blockchain
Microgrids
Energy 
Network, ICT, 
Business
Automatic energy 
trading platform
PeerEnergyCloud Germany 2012
Cloud-based P2P energy 
trading platform
Microgrids
Energy 
Network, ICT
Cloud-based P2P 
energy trading platform
Piclo UK 2014
P2P energy trading 
platform
National level Business
P2P energy trading 
platform
Electron UK 2016
Blockchain-enabled 
consumer energy 
services
TBA
Energy 
Network, ICT, 
Business
Under development
Vandebron Netherlands 2014
P2P energy trading 
platform
National Business
P2P energy trading 
platform
SmartWatts Germany 2011
Optimize energy supply 
through ICT
Regional
Energy 
Network, ICT
Smart meter control 
interface
SonnenCommunity Germany 2015
P2P energy trading with 
battery storage
National
P2P energy 
trading 
platform
P2P energy trading 
platform
Table 3 . Comparison of Projects
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PeerEnergyCloud focus on identifying key ICT technologies for use in P2P LEM. As such, 
research was focused on technological development, along with the proposal for various 
market scenarios. Finally, Transactive Grid and Electron pioneer the integration of Blockchain 
technology to simplify and optimize consumer energy services. 
Based on previously discussed insights, it then becomes necessary to address how 
LEMs can contribute to the quick development of the sector. The advantages enabled by smart 
markets have been analyzed in the previous section. Localized energy markets manage to 
conciliate these advantages with the benefits provided by disintermediation and market 
dynamics. Essentially, the use case for such markets is pretty clear (Parag & Sovacool, 2016), 
as they enable larger local production and the rise of new prosumers, while also having a key 
role in addressing climate change concerns. In doing so, they effectively manage to fulfill the 
rising need for more decentralized and liberal markets, while also harnessing the benefits of 
smart markets.  
Investment in smart technology related to better management of RES has shown a clear 
upward trend, boasting a 15% year-on-year increase in 2016 (Bloomberg New Energy Finance, 
2017). On that same note, $1.4 Billion were invested into Blockchain-related projects in 2016 
alone (Cryptocoinsnews, 2016), a clear sign of the added importance being placed on this 
interaction between technology and energy management. The increasing importance attributed 
to this interaction leads to a secondary research goal, understanding how Blockchain 
technology can be used to boost the efficiency of local energy markets. Since the concept of 
efficiency is hard to quantify directly, a set of hypothesis related to market performance in 
various scenarios will be presented and posteriorly analyzed. 
 
2.3.3 LEM and Reductions in Equilibrium Price 
Going by the points presented throughout the previous section, it becomes clear that 
one of the major expected impacts of the establishment of local energy exchanges is the 
reduction of grid variability. A higher degree of grid variability leads to more frequent power 
outages as peak consumption periods require the adjustment of production capacity, which is 
still difficult to do accurately and quickly. Aggregation of users has been shown to help reduce 
said risks of grid variability (American Physical Society, 2011). In that sense, LEMs help 
smooth out household consumption profiles and therefore reduce the risks of service failures 
and inadequate or insufficient supply. 
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Coupled with this, another significant consumer-centric movement is taking place. As 
smartgrids and LEM become more prevalent, the untapped economic potentials of market 
creation and management become more apparent. While the previous section attempted to 
provide a general overview of both pre-established and upcoming business models in the 
sector, most current iterations are still highly location-dependent or focused on pilot studies 
rather than direct market implementations. However, if market trends are maintained or 
intensified, and as the novelty wears off, a directly competing determinant of user choice will 
be the expected cost savings resulting from participation in the LEM and trade with other users 
(Aguirre & Ibikunle, 2014). 
The first approach will be the study of how an increase of market size, in number of 
participants, contributes to a more efficient market operation due to the added volume of energy 
transacted and therefore lower equilibrium price. While extreme profit-seeking behavior can 
impact the overall utility created, added competition should lead to more efficient markets 
(Haruvy & Popkowski, 2016). Such logic leads to the first hypothesis to be tested: 
 
H1a: An increased size of LEM leads to a reduction in the equilibrium price. 
 
However, an added consideration is important, namely the fact that there is likely an 
ideal size, after which the marginal gains in market efficiency become smaller as size is further 
increased. The goal is therefore to find optimal market size that leads to a larger reduction in 
price and therefore cheaper consumption profiles. In that sense, a subset of the previous 
hypothesis will need to be analyzed: 
 
H1b: Size increases of LEM will, after a certain point, provide diminishing marginal 
improvements in the equilibrium price. 
 
 
2.3.4 Peer-to-Peer Market Model 
Before establishing the next set of assumptions, it is important to clarify the concrete 
market set-up and preexisting conditions which govern the interactions of users among each 
other and with the grid. P2P energy markets have emerged as another step towards 
decentralized energy markets. In essence, each individual participant is free to choose where 
to direct his excess energy and also where to purchase additional energy should his demand be 
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larger than his production. Management questions regarding the interaction between micro and 
macro grids need to be analyzed in-depth, as the central entity in charge of ensuring supply and 
offsetting intermittency would be target of scrutiny (Olivares et al., 2014) and require well-
defined frameworks. To get around the issue of load matching and network stability, Brusco et 
al. (2014) defend the aggregation of prosumers into energy districts, each with a coalition 
manager who is in charge of the optimal operation of the district. Other research (Bernardon et 
al., 2014) suggests that reconfiguring the distribution network to account for these new types 
of users is an optimization problem, which can be solved through the development of smart 
grids. Such developments are enabled by the quick increase in computing power, easier access 
to information and better automation tools (Bernardon et al., 2014; Karnouskos, 2011). The 
idealization of a LEM will be based on previous studies (Block et al., 2008) (Lamparter et al., 
2010) (Mengelkamp et al., 2017) and centered around the local exchange of electricity 
produced by PV systems based on a double auction via a closed order book.  
 
2.3.5 Market Structure and Impact on Price Fluctuations 
While significant literature has been developed on the efficiency of energy markets, 
such studies have generally been based off of aggregation at a larger scale, not at a local level. 
Given this study’s focus on local electricity exchange, it becomes important to assess how 
smaller aggregations are effected by the volatility of RES and household profiles. As the 
market mechanism is based on an auction, such an evaluation is particularly crucial. To 
maximize profit, different household profiles will adopt different bidding strategies to 
maximize their profit (Prabavathi & Gnanadass, 2015), and therefore affect the equilibrium 
price in different ways. The general hypothesis to be tested is: 
 
H2a: The structure of a local energy market impacts the degree of equilibrium price reduction. 
 
However, such a hypothesis seems to provide insufficient information regarding how 
the structure of a market impacts its effectiveness at achieving lower prices. As such, further 
hypotheses have to be tested: 
 
H2b: Prosumer-only local energy markets lead to larger decreases in the equilibrium price. 
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In a logical sense, this hypothesis appears to be straightforward, as markets made up of 
only prosumers, all with electricity generation capabilities leads to lower external energy needs 
and therefore lower likelihood of unfulfilled market orders. The incentives for each household 
also become more closely tied together, which should lead to similar utility functions. The final 
step was understanding how structure and size interacted and identifying the key conditions to 
ensure below-average market prices 
 
H2c: Heterogeneous structures in LEM achieve larger price reductions per unitary increase in 
market size. 
 
2.3.6 Blockchain and IoT Affect Market Effectiveness 
To further complete this study, it felt necessary to study the effects of technological 
advances on smart markets and overall grid equilibrium price. While a great part of this 
evaluation will be mainly based on an exploratory analysis, a few keys benefits can be 
somewhat quantified. One of the key innovations in the development of local markets is the 
rise of smart meters, that enable instantaneous metering and net power flow evaluation, as well 
as a facilitation of further electricity exchanges throughout. In that sense, the hypothesis to test 
will be related to how the presence of smart meters in a local market helps decrease price: 
 
H3: LEM where users own smart meters benefit from larger decreases in equilibrium price. 
 
As for the impact of Blockchain, the main benefits are complete automation and 
replacement of manually performing-aggregators with a fully decentralized decision system. 
This helps reduce socioeconomic and research costs linked to intelligence systems, as well as 
eliminate the coordination costs between generator and retailer (Bosco et al., 2016). In the case 
of a local market, this enables bundle-formation and prediction algorithms to be updated in 
real-time and more accurately reflect power flow fluctuations. Furthermore, the possibility of 
setting up smart contracts allows for better monitoring and reporting tools, which are useful to 
consumers in reducing expenditure and ensuring a simpler access to information. Lastly, one 
has to consider the benefits provided by the Blockchain in easily connecting a larger number 
of market participants, functioning as a market coupling mechanism (Keppler et al., 2017). 
Such a premise will be studied through a purely exploratory hypothesis: 
 
H4: LEM in Blockchain markets achieve greater reductions in equilibrium price. 
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3. METHODOLOGY 
3.1 DATASET DESCRIPTION 
Data used throughout this study is made up of recorded household electricity production 
and consumption data in 15-minute intervals, measured in kilowatt hours (kWh). It originates 
from the ‘Pecan Street’ project, which aims to advance and facilitate research and innovation 
in the energy field. Formed in 2010, it consists of a large source of disaggregated consumer 
energy data, provided by a network of volunteer households mainly based in Austin, Texas. 
The significance for this study is the facilitation of analysis of real-time energy consumption 
and production, which will be posteriorly used to simulate a market auction and ultimately 
predict the equilibrium price. 
 
3.1.1 Sample 
In keeping within the scope of this study, the aggregation of households in LEM, the 
focus will be on residential buildings. Pecan Street further divides these buildings into “Single-
Family Home”, “Town Home” and “Apartment” segments, however the different typologies 
will not be looked at individually. The database provided by Pecan Street is currently 
comprised of around 550 individual houses which were merged with data descriptives collected 
from Metadata, describing the profile of each household. Posteriorly, conditions such as 
coincident time periods of study participation, location and entireness of information were used 
as basic criteria for selection, resulting in a drawn sample of 310 households (Source: Pecan 
Street Inc. Dataport 2017). Such a sample size ensures that conclusions can be drawn with 
acceptable levels of confidence and error margins (Schulz & Grimes, 2005).  
 
3.1.2 Variables of study 
This section presents and briefly explains the variables of interest to be studied. 
Input variables: use, gen, grid. 
These three variables are directly drawn from the Pecan Street database and will be the 
basis for setting up agent utility functions. Use presents electricity demand of a certain time 
interval, including both self-production and grid purchases. Gen details the electricity 
generated by a PV system over a certain time interval. Finally, grid identifies energy drawn 
from the grid over a time interval. It will be used measure the electrical deficit or surplus faced 
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at each period), quantifying the electricity available to be transacted by each agent at every 
auction round (grid=gen-use). 
 
Market size 
An independent variable, market size will be the first variable analyzed to understand 
how different market sizes affect equilibrium price. Market size will be manipulated at pre-
determined intervals, with range being limited between 5 and 50 participant households. 
Dimensions below 5 were not considered, as results are too dependent on the individual 
households selected.  
 
Market structure 
Three separate profiles (consumer, prosumer and heterogeneous) will be controlled for, 
to better understand the importance of heterogeneity in such a market. Consumer and Prosumer 
profiles will be fully made up of households that fall into said characteristics, while 
Heterogeneous will have a mixture of consumers and prosumers at different levels of 
representativeness. In running simulations, market structure was quantified in terms of overall 
electricity generated during the month as a percentage of total monthly electricity demand for 
all agents participating in that specific simulation. This variable allows for the elimination of 
some exogenous factors like weather conditions and consumption behavior. 
 
Equilibrium price 
The main dependent variable of this study, a brief insight into equilibrium price has 
been developed in the preceding sections. The equilibrium price will be calculated as the 
weighted average of all transactions completed in the LEM simulation. Since grid interaction 
is still present, two different offsets of price results will be achieved: the local price will reflect 
the average cost of electricity resulting from P2P trades in the market, while the overall price 
(denomination used interchangeably with equilibrium price) will also be weighted with a 
percentage of transactions completed with the grid. 
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3.1.3 Univariate Analysis 
This section focuses on the analysis of variables selected for simulation at an univariate 
level. At its core, the goal is to examine aggregate household electricity consumption and 
production data to create a basis for simulation. Looking into the 125 consumer households 
present in this sample, the first step was ranking them in descending order of overall usage, as 
represented in Figure 5. 
 
 
 
It is clear that 3 households consume a disproportionate amount of electricity compared 
to the rest and, furthermore, the top 20% of households account for nearly 40% of total 
electricity usage. As such, monthly consumer usage data is clearly not uniformly distributed, 
with a positive skew. The consideration of all households in the sample leads to an average 
monthly consumption of 2,565 kWh, greatly superior to the average for households in Austin, 
Texas (Residential Monthly kWh and Bills, data.austintexas.gov). Focusing on the 185 sample 
prosumers, a similar analysis was conducted. Figure 6 shows the monthly usage and generation 
of electricity from each household, ranked in descending order of overall usage. 
 
 
Figure 5  – Consumer Monthly Electricity Use
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In terms of electricity usage, skewness is maintained in the case of prosumers, with the 
top 20% households accounting for 38% of total monthly consumption. The average 
consumption is also superior to that of consumers, with a value of 3,051 kWh. Generation 
appears to be more evenly distributed, with values more concentrated towards the mean of 
2,436 kWh generated each month. An interesting point of analysis is the fact that the average 
monthly electricity consumption of prosumers is superior to that of consumers by 491 kWh. 
Table 4 presents descriptive statistics, with another particularity being the differences in 
standard deviation. Prosumers exhibit a greater spread of consumption data, which also leads 
to larger differences between mean and median. 
 
 
 
 
Consumers
Consumption [kWh] Consumption [kWh] Generation [kWh]
Minimum 409 696 189
Mean 2565 3052 2436
Median 2259 2699 2524
Maximum 10999 12687 5814
Standard Deviation 1644.8 1825.8 785.1
Prosumers
Table 4 - Descriptive Statistics for Average Monthly Electricity Data
Figure 6  – Prosumer Monthly Electricity Use and Generation
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Figure 7 presents the average consumption during the month of April 2016, 
discriminating between consumers and prosumers. Generally, it is clear that trends are closely 
comparable for consumers and prosumers, with fluctuations in consumption occurring in the 
same periods and with similar scaling. 
 
 
 
 
Noteworthy is the consistent decrease in consumption as the month progresses, which 
might be due to general weather changes throughout the month. In fact, a deeper look into 
temperatures recorded in Austin, Texas (Past Weather in Austin, Texas; 
www.timeanddate.com/weather/) appears to confirm this hypothesis and ascertain an inverse 
correlation between recorded temperature and electricity consumption. Upward fluctuations 
recorded at certain days also match those of weekends, for the most part. Such behavior is quite 
predictable, as weekends usually elicit higher consumptions as members of the household 
spend larger periods of time at home. 
The final point relates to the larger values of consumption recorded in the days between 
18 and 20 of April. This spike appears to also have a localized cause, the ‘April 2016 North 
American storm complex’ (Winter Storm Vexo; weather.com). This event, a storm system 
Figure 7  – Average Daily Electricity Usage for April 2016
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originated in the Rocky Mountains near Austin, caused a large snowstorm and heavy rain in 
the area, resulting in severe flooding across Texas (Iowa Environmental Mesonet; 
mesonet.agron.iastate.edu). Such a natural event had a more profound impact in prosumer 
households, as unexpected decreases in PV generation force higher levels of grid reliance. 
While outside the scope of the research conducted throughout, market behavior when facing 
unpredictable shocks should be a key consideration when designing LEMs. 
 
3.2 SIMULATION SETUP 
Simulation assists in understanding a real need, in this case the analysis of how to set 
up LEMs to reduce equilibrium price and effectively achieve a higher level of overall utility. 
Since all households are unique and therefore get dissimilar benefits from market changes, 
there is no unique solution. Repeated simulations allow us to obtain generalizability meaning 
that the results from this study can be applied to different participants and settings. Analysis is 
made possible through Monte Carlo Simulations, which rely on repeated random sampling to 
normalize results (Sawilowsky, 2009). This approach is particularly important in the context 
of this study, as household profiles vary greatly, therefore obtaining a single result would be 
far from representative. Research was designed to account for 25 iterations of the simulation 
process, to ensure accuracy and allow comparison between different outputs. 
 
3.2.1 Auction mechanism 
The proposed market functions through a double auction with a single clearing price, 
determined at discrete market close times, which were set-up in 15-minute time intervals 
lasting a month. Trading is done inside each time slot, with agents limited to a single bid per 
period. Number of participants will be scaled between 5 and 50, N = [1, 2,…, 50]  
Bids are placed at period t to satisfy demand applicable in t+1. Each participant is 
considered a buyer or seller depending on his gridi t for a specific interval and the market 
clearing price (pet) is determined as the lowest bid that can still be filled given aggregate market 
demand. Extra electricity to balance demand and supply mismatches is provided by an energy 
provider via the grid, whose behavior is simulated by an agent with unlimited bids and asks. 
This agent can purchase or sell as much electricity as demanded at the prices offered by 
traditional utilities, which will henceforth serve as the lower and upper bounds of market price. 
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At the end of each simulation, all market clearing prices are averaged resulting in a single 
monthly local price.  
In practice, the market functioning mechanism would be implemented through a smart 
contract on a permissioned Blockchain, as described previously. Such a setup removes the need 
for a central entity and streamlines much of the process, mainly by incorporating an immediate 
payment method and having the Blockchain act as an escrow. In the interest of simplicity, fees 
and taxes are considered scalable and currency exchange rates assumed to be negligible. This 
market set-up matches all but one of the LEM market requirements (Block et al., 2008) as it is 
made up of an online system that uses price signals to match supply and demand and reflect 
market allocation of electricity. The connection to the traditional grid ensures stability and 
reliability of the system as there is a method to balance the market whenever necessary. Finally, 
generation and consumption data is forecasted at the individual level and posteriorly used to 
match market constraints. 
 
3.2.2 Optimization problem 
The market outcome is measured as the weighted average of electricity costs for the 
total pool of participating agents. Market lower and upper limits match grid prices when 
purchasing or selling electricity. Since the Pecan Street database is based on a specific city, 
Austin, such limits will be defined at specific prices offered by utilities at the time of data 
collection. Since most of Texas benefits from an open competition market with various 
electricity providers, there is no single price that is verifiable across the city. Data comes from 
the Public Utility Commission of Texas and, for the considered period, the lowest possible rate 
offered that matched the average consumption of households was the one used for comparison 
(Retail Electricity Price Comparisons, April 2016). Using the most affordable option enables 
analysis into whether LEMs are always superior, price-wise, compared to utilities. In that 
sense, the market upper limit will coincide with the retail price, pu= $0.1474 per kWh. As for 
the lower limit, it will be equal to the most beneficial feed-in tariff available to customers, in 
this case pl= $0.0763 as offered by Austin Energy (Tax Credits, Rebates and Savings; 
energy.gov). The model is designed in such a way to minimize overall electricity costs and 
therefore limit grid interaction (g) by maximizing market self-consumption. Market outcome 
is represented the sum of electricity amounts, qe ij t, sold between agents i and j at price p
e  at 
time t. 
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For each timeslot, the optimization problem will be defined by four constraints, following the 
framework suggested by (Mengelkamp et al., 2017). Constraint (2) forces each agent to satisfy 
his demand and sell his excess generation, while constraints (3) and (4) allow the grid to 
balance supply and demand. Constraint (5) ensures that only positive amounts of electricity are 
traded. 
 
 
 
3.2.3 Agent behavior 
For each trading period, every agent determines the maximum price he is willing to pay 
for electricity or the minimum price he is willing to sell his own electricity at. In testing market 
functioning processes, bidding strategies mirror those used by zero-intelligence(ZI) agents, an 
approach firstly suggested by Gode & Sunder (1993). These agents possess no inherent 
capacity to learn from previous actions and adapt their behavior strategically, meaning that this 
price limit is randomly assigned within the pre-determined ranges. Generally, these agents 
merely follow their budget constraints and avoid losing money. In this case, ZI agents used are 
considered to be constrained, in that they cannot bid higher than their valuation or ask below 
cost. Such constrained agents are considered more efficient (Anufriev et al., 2013) due to the 
added individual rationality caused by the presence of constraints.  
For disregarding socio-economic reasons besides their inherent valuations, agents are 
typically classified as a lower-bound of market efficiency (Vytelingum et al., 2010). However, 
studies on isolated agent participation in a market show that ZI agents can very efficiently trade 
within a simulated market and prices typically converge to the equilibrium price predicted by 
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economic theory (Blebaron, 2007). Such an inference shows that market efficiency is typically 
more impacted by market design rather than agent behavior (Farmer et al., 2005). 
 
3.2.4 Data Preparation and Implementation 
Observations were collected from the Pecan Street database through use of a SQL 
server. Energy consumption data is organized by household id, presenting the recorded values 
for each variable in 15-minute time segments. As such, each household can be matched to 96 
daily observations, leading to a total of 2880 observations per household throughout the month, 
resulting in a total pool of 892.800 observation points. The last step was organizing data by 
time period, ensuring that all 310 sampled households can take part in the auction 
simultaneously. Further treatment of data was not required, as periods where electricity 
consumption is zero are reasonable and should, therefore, be included. 
Posteriorly, Matlab was used to aggregate data and randomly select the households to 
be included for each simulation. After selecting the strata, data for each household was used to 
perform the simulated auction during the month of April 2016. The inputs used are summarized 
in Table 5. 
 
  
 
Figure 8 provides a simplified overview of the aggregation and simulation process. It 
starts with market size 5 and run 1, with every auction starting at midnight 01/04/2016. 
 
 
  
Parameter Value
Run 1 to 25
Market Size 5 to 50
NPF 15-min net power flow for each household
Table 5 - Inputs Used for Simulation
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4. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
 
The subsequent section will be focused on reporting and analyzing the obtained results, 
to assess whether they support the hypotheses previously laid out. A total of 1650 auctions 
were simulated. 
 
4.1 MAIN RESULTS 
As each auction finished, resulting prices were placed into a matrix and connected to 
the applicable simulation parameters. Figure 9 shows the distribution of overall achieved. 
Naturally, due to the optimization constraints and market limits created, all prices fit into the 
interval [$0.0763; $0.1474]. Given the repetitive nature of the auction process, achieving one 
price every 15 minutes and then averaging all prices throughout the month, values tend to be 
closer to the mean. 
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Further analysis required prices to be plotted on a daily basis for the month of April, as 
the univariate analysis previously conducted on the dataset already highlighted the variable 
nature of electricity generation and demand. Figure 10 shows such a distribution and highlights 
that, as anticipated, net daily demand is a somewhat accurate predictor of average daily prices. 
This is particularly true for overall prices, while local prices appear to be modified at a smaller 
magnitude. 
 
 
 
Given the ZI nature of agent bidding strategies, bidders are not capable of taking into 
account exogenous events and prior knowledge when developing their strategy, and henceforth 
fail to recognize when market competition increases. As such, bids submitted are of lower 
value than the optimal equilibrium price, leading to market clearing prices that do not increase 
enough to offset the added demand for electricity. Furthermore, this limitation forces an 
unusual number of agents to rely on the grid, causing the clear disparity between two sets of 
prices by inflating the overall price. Another interesting point of observation are the changes 
recorded between week-days and weekends (Table 6), with equilibrium prices being, on 
average, $0,29 higher during the weekend. Such a result is supported by literature, as estimates 
state that weekends lead household electricity demand to increase by 5 to 10%, on average. 
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Figure 10  – Average Daily Prices Resulting from Simulation
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After further data treatment, results were also categorized based on market structure 
that originated them, being separated into heterogeneous and prosumer-only groups. 
Consumer-only auctions were not considered to offer relevant prices, as all trading will be 
made up of electricity purchases at grid prices and therefore all results are similar. Direct 
comparisons between these two types of structures allow for some preliminary conclusions to 
be drawn and helps guide further analysis. 
Heterogeneous structures resulted in a price distribution similar to the one for all 
simulations. Such similarities were to be expected, as a large percentage of all completed 
simulations fit into this structure. Prosumer structures resulted in lower prices, although the 
difference is not particularly significant. 
 
4.2 GRID SIZE IMPACT ON MARKET EFFICIENCY 
The first hypothesis questioned whether a larger market size leads to reductions in 
overall prices achieved as the auction mechanism is implemented. Two distinct market 
structures were tested, a heterogeneous one made up of both consumers and prosumers and a 
prosumer-only structure. Although it appears that both tend to follow similar trends throughout, 
the magnitude of effects is different. By analyzing them separately, isolated causes and effects 
become clear and posterior comparison between structures provides a more accurate overall 
representation. 
Before doing so, the aggregate results were analyzed and plotted, as shown in Figure 
11. Looking at the full graph of obtained results, it appears clear that as market size increases, 
agents benefit from lower prices, both locally and in equilibrium. This goes in support of H1a.  
As market size increases towards the limit of 50 participants, overall price converges towards 
local price, as added liquidity in the market reduces the need for grid interaction. Small market 
sizes (5 to 15 participants) appear to be less efficient, as recorded prices are still greater than 
the average, and each additional participant causes a significant direct reduction in equilibrium 
Week Weekend
Local Price ($) 0,1028 0,1041
Δ Local Price ($)
Equilibrium Price ($) 0,1088 0,1117
Δ Equilibrium Price ($)
0,125
0,29
Table 6 - Week to Weekend Price Comparison
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price. However, on the opposite side of the scale, larger markets (ranging from 40 to 50 
participants) present more similar results across simulations, suggesting that market size loses 
statistical relevance when explaining prices. Such a behavior justifies support of Hypothesis 
1b), as gains from price reduction appear to hit a point of diminishing returns around a localized 
minimum.  
 
 
 
4.3 GRID STRUCTURE IMPACT ON MARKET EFFICIENCY 
The second hypothesis concerned how changes in market structure impact prices. The 
first important consideration is how this market structure was quantified. Considerations from 
looking into absolute or relative number of prosumers in a given sample risked creating 
conflicting results since the generation capability of prosumers is not normally distributed, as 
concluded previously. While the absolute number of prosumers involved is relevant, having 
ten prosumers with low generating capabilities or one who generates as much as these ten on 
aggregate causes disparate market incentives for equal quantities of electricity added into the 
market. As presented before, market structure was quantified in terms of overall electricity 
generated during the month as a percentage of total monthly electricity demand for all agents. 
By such a logic, a value of 100% generation means that electricity produced by prosumer 
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Figure 11  – Average Electricity Prices per Unit of Market Size
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agents is equal to total electricity demanded by all agents. Even though demand equals supply, 
this setup does not eliminate the need for agents to interact with the grid, as temporal disparities 
mean there will be some periods with excess demand and some with excess supply. 
Looking at the overall data first, the relation between added generation and lower prices 
appears to be clear. Prices decline faster at first, with just a small added value of generation 
leading to larger decreases. Afterwards, market structures with different generation percentages 
were isolated, in the form of intervals ranging from 0-20%, 21-40%, 41-60%, 60-81% and 81-
100%. Posteriorly, a scatter plot highlighting all the achieved prices with said structure was 
created, allowing for direct comparison between different levels of generation capability. From 
such a graphical analysis, conclusions can be drawn that, in general, changes from one market 
structure to another with higher generation percentage translates directly to lower prices. This 
effect arises when comparing any two structures. Evidence supports H2a, in that LEM structure 
affects the degree of price decrease attainable. Table 7 below presents the average prices 
resulting from the executed simulations that fit into the intervals previously mentioned, as well 
as the absolute and relative changes between structures. 
 
 
A separate analysis was conducted whereby the simulations fitting the intervals were 
separated according to the agents involved: one for a heterogeneous structure, and one for 
prosumer-only. This draws from the insights provided when presenting the generation 
percentage variable, as two structures with similar generation percentages can have greatly 
disparate aggregate supply and demand depending on which agents populate the market. 
In the interest of ensuring representativeness and statistical relevance of results, 
research will be focused on the intermediate intervals which have larger data points. This 
narrower focus is necessary as only 21 simulations fit into the 0-40% range while remaining 
prosumer-only, and only 7 fit into the 81-100% interval while including consumers. Prices for 
Generation Capacity Average Price ($/kWh) Number of Observations
0-20% 0,1255 354
21-40% 0,1217 309
41-60% 0,1156 182
61-80% 0,1083 113
81-100% 0,1045 42
Average Absolute Δ
Average Relative Δ
Table 7 - Price Comparison of Different Levels of Generation Capacity
0,00525
4,70%
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each individual level of generation (41-80%) were averaged, resulting in a single observation 
per structure for each level. Furthermore, only overall prices were considered, as they allow 
for a clearer analysis of grid interactions. As can be seen on Figure 12, comparison between 
intervals does not fully support H2b. While indeed lower, prices are too similar for us to state 
with certainty that strictly prosumer-only market structures achieve lower prices, all else being 
equal. 
 
 
4.4 HETEROGENEOUS MARKET STRUCTURES PERFORM BEST  
The next focus was understanding how market structure and size interact and affect 
equilibrium prices. As seen previously, Hypothesis 1 appears to hold true for both structures, 
although trend lines are blurrier due to the higher amplitude of results recorded. Of particular 
note are the clear distinctions between local and equilibrium price, as increases in market size 
appear to affect both differently. Such a conclusion appears to suggest that, after a certain size, 
structure is a better determinant of price. In prosumer-only markets, price results follow a 
similar trend to that of equilibrium price in the previous case, albeit with a lower absolute value. 
Insights from literature suggest this effect is likely caused by the disproportionate amount of 
supply and demand added by each additional prosumer. Despite how most prosumers appear 
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to have a negative net grid interaction, making them a buyer of electricity, periods of lower 
usage coincide with those of larger generation and help flood the market with a surplus of 
electricity, bringing the whole monthly average price down. It appears that prosumer LEMs 
achieve lower equilibrium prices than heterogeneous markets in small to medium-sized 
markets (5-25 participants) market, while both structures converge to more similar prices as 
size increases. The larger decrease in overall price verifiable in some data points appears to be 
related to the generation capacity of the selected prosumers, as some simulations reach a point 
where there is a surplus of generated electricity for which there is no demand. Such scenario 
forces agents to sell that electricity back to the grid at the lower-bound of market price. Figure 
13 compares the evolution of prices for both types of structures as market size increases. On 
the lower end of market size, prosumer structures naturally result in higher prices, as there are 
less participants generating electricity to offset the total demand. However, as size increases, 
prices converge to a below-average value. 
Posteriorly, this graphical analysis was combined with a multiple regression whereby 
size and structure act as an interaction term. Results confirm that H2c) holds true, 
heterogeneous structures in LEM achieve larger price reductions per unitary increase in market 
size. 
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4.5 TECHNOLOGY IN LOCAL ENERGY MARKETS 
Following analysis into the structure and size of LEM, it is important to understand how 
various technological developments alter or magnify the previous results. The third hypothesis 
intended to assess how ownership of a smart meter affected agent performance in the market. 
The advantages offered by smart meters are mainly related to automation and real-time 
monitoring, which are a crucial tool for any P2P market, as is the case with the present auction-
based LEM. Therefore, on a purely exploratory basis, the direct effect between smart meter 
installation and lower electricity expenditure appears to be straightforward. 
However, to understand the impact of the installation of these devices on overall prices 
for all participating agents, an additional set of simulations was performed. To do so, price 
intervals were converted to 30-minutes, both in terms of agents use and generation but also 
auction periods. The logic behind such a decision is that, as smart meters become more 
commonplace and market functioning is better understood, predictive capabilities should 
increase. As such, bidding agents can more accurately prepare for future periods by altering 
their bidding strategy and domestic electricity usage. In this simplified approach with ZI 
bidding, price analysis is merely to be used as a starting point for further research, as it will 
mainly reflect the lesser need to interact with the grid due to the added market liquidity. 
Overall results from the new set of simulations were quite similar to the ones first 
reported in this chapter. The average equilibrium price recorded was $0,1152/kWh, while for 
the local price, it was $0,1093. In the case of prosumer-only structures, average equilibrium 
price is quite higher than previously. Such a phenomenon appears to mirror a change in 
preferences, whereby prosumers are less willing to sell their excess generation in period t+1 if 
they can accurately predict they will have a shortage of electricity in t+2. This behavior, allied 
with the previously mentioned temporal discrepancies between periods of major generation 
and larger use, explains the obtained results. 
As for heterogeneous coalitions, larger decision periods clearly benefit most market 
participants, as both average prices were recorded at lower values. In this case, consumers help 
smooth consumption profiles by proactively purchasing extra electricity when there is 
excessive supply in the market. As such, the need for grid interaction is typically reserved for 
afternoon and weekend periods defined by higher demand. Although providing interesting 
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insights, behavior predicted in H3 happens only in heterogeneous markets and, as such, this 
hypothesis cannot be fully supported. 
The last step was analyzing the impact of Blockchain implementation in LEMs to 
understand how it helps improve the efficiency of distributed generation and aggregation of 
agents. Although not directly quantifiable with the current proposed setup, this exploratory 
analysis should help provide a clearer overview of Blockchain’s potential. Advantages and 
disadvantages applicable to this specific scenario will be highlighted and accompanied with 
concrete considerations when building real-world application. 
Use of Blockchain as the main ICT technology provides various intangible benefits, the 
first of which are the security, transparency and reliability that the system innately provides. 
These benefits stem mainly from Blockchain’s own characteristics like the irreversibility and 
public records of every transaction.  By tracking every kWh ever transacted, consumers with 
no generation capabilities can also take part in sustainable movements by ensuring their used 
electricity comes from renewable sources. Additionally, since payments would be done 
through cryptocurrencies, additional incentives can be tied to generation capacity to incentivize 
prosumers. Combined with the direct benefits resulting from decentralization and automation, 
namely reduced grid dependence, the Blockchain can serve as a clear proponent of the rising 
prosumer movement. Additionally, newer and innovative business models will be made 
feasible, while also offering established players the opportunity to innovate their current 
models. Another specific application in this market would be the use of Blockchain as a fully 
automated payment platform for billing and electricity transactions. By doing so, market 
operators can ensure cheap and instantaneous transactions without requiring any human 
interaction. 
However, even then, fully harnessing these benefits will require adequate planning as 
previous discussion has highlighted, for example, the differences between public and 
permissioned chains. Further evaluations will also be necessary in terms of Blockchain-related 
costs, ranging from transaction specific costs to energy usage and computational resources 
required. While a private Blockchain helps reduce some costs, added energy usage still defeats 
the purpose of establishing a LEM, so a middle ground will be necessary. Furthermore, 
scalability concerns are still present, and while establishing a single LEM of the size proposed 
is feasible, interconnecting various LEMs for added decentralization is still a major challenge. 
The fact that it is also a new technology, combined with somewhat high entry costs in terms of 
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necessary knowledge may reduce consumer interest, increasing the importance of design, 
usability and marketing considerations. 
Table 8 provides an overview of the main benefits and drawbacks of Blockchain 
implementation. Given the medium to long-term view adopted when considering the feasibility 
and benefits of Blockchain implementation, it appears to be a complementary technology, 
rather than a direct substitute for current practices. The diffusion of smart meters and related 
technologies will be absolutely crucial for the Blockchain to achieve its potential. At the same 
time, progress will be heavily dictated by the success of future implementations and regulatory 
approaches adopted. Combined with previous analysis, H4 cannot be supported in full, as there 
are plenty of questions to be answered before Blockchain can be directly linked to a decrease 
in electricity prices in LEMs. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Advantages Disadvantages
Security Market-formation costs
Transparency Resource-intensive
Instantaneous Energy consumption
Reliability Scalability
Payment platform Complexity of design
Low fee transactions Need for complementary infrastructure
Disintermediation Perceived difficulty of use
Incentivize prosumers Medium-term implementation
Table 8 - Advantages and Disadvantages of Blockchain Implementation in LEM
 46 
 
5. CONCLUSIONS 
This section provides an overview of the main research conclusions. Additionally, 
research limitations are discussed, and possible future studies and research methods suggested. 
 
5.1 GENERAL CONCLUSIONS 
The goal of this dissertation was to understand the impact of Blockchain and other IoT 
technologies in revolutionizing the renewable energy sector, namely through the development 
of P2P energy exchanges such as LEMs. In doing so, market design and strategic approaches 
were presented as a way to define and analyze the feasibility of developing business models 
around these markets. Analysis carried throughout the initial literature review served to clarify 
the current trends in the industry and the process of innovation by which prosumerism and 
microgrids gained added relevance. Additionally, an overview of current approaches for 
prosumer management and incentives schemes helped highlight flaws in the current 
deployment of these methods. 
To understand the feasibility and promise of such setups, the methodological part of 
this thesis was concerned with evaluating how different setups work and the electricity prices 
achieved by each one. Results showed that prices are competitive with other established 
business models in the industry and encourage the posterior development of alternative models. 
We therefore conclude the business case feasibility of developing local energy markets in areas 
with current high level of prosumer engagement, with the selling point being the lower prices 
offered. 
Posteriorly, comparison between other projects using Blockchain technology served to 
highlight the wide array of possible applications, but also the heterogeneity and localized nature 
of each project. These insights help navigate the complex environment that is the creation of 
localized energy markets relying on Peer-to-Peer exchanges, in a way that minimizes set up 
costs and ensures further scalability of the grid. The use of Blockchain was also assessed, 
leading to the conclusion that it works best as a complementary tech, as there are still 
technological barriers to overcome and the need for more practical implementations. 
Regulation was also determined to play an important role in the innovation process of the 
renewable energy sector and will, therefore, have to be taken into careful consideration when 
developing a business model. 
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As for more concrete conclusions, simulation results allow us to determine that market 
size is indeed a determinant of equilibrium price, with both being inversely correlated. This is 
particularly true for medium-sized markets, as larger ones appear to hit a point of diminishing 
returns where structure becomes the main determinant of price. Further analysis into market 
structure showed that it does indeed affect prices, but the optimal participant base should 
include both consumers and prosumers. This partially reflects another finding, that 
heterogeneous structures benefit from larger utility gains per unit of market size increase, as 
consumption profiles become smoother. The overall consideration of these conclusions points 
to an ideal market setup with 30 to 40 heterogeneous participants, provided their self-
generating capacity ranks above 60% of overall electricity demand 
In a final, more explorative manner, we concluded that the link between use of smart 
meters and direct price reductions cannot be stated with absolute certainty. However, 
Blockchain was shown to have characteristics that enable better functioning of LEMs, provided 
it is used as a complementary technology to smart meters and predictive tools. All in all, this 
dissertation contributed to ascertain the business case feasibility of developing LEMs, as well 
as provide guidance regarding recommended strategies and design considerations, to ensure 
maximum market efficiency and effectiveness. 
 
5.2 LIMITATIONS 
Methodologically the present study is faced with some limitations which will 
henceforth be presented and discussed. Firstly, in terms of data collection, Texas is not an ideal 
area to attain generality of results. This issue arises as weather and tax conditions contribute to 
make electricity prices much cheaper than the United States average. There is also a lack of 
alternative household profiles to be used as comparison, as even electricity usage stats are much 
higher than the average household. These factors may limit the applicability of the present 
research in other markets, like the European one, where ideal market sizes and structures could 
be quite different. Given the assumptions taken on prosumer penetration, incentive schemes 
present and cost-behavior, these results may suffer from even larger variations in diverse 
contexts. Costs will also have to be considered more in depth, in terms of both LEM creation 
and operation. 
As far as methodology goes, the use of a Monte Carlo simulation means that results 
achieved are expected values and may vary from those obtained through optimized modeling 
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or by using agents other than ZI. Even though they achieve high levels of market efficiency, 
research would benefit from seeing how more advanced agents develop trading strategies 
throughout the month and adapt to exogenous shocks. Since consumption and generation were 
already pre-determined for the whole month, this does not allow for insights into how 
consumers might adapt their household profile depending on current market prices. The 
positive skewness present in household consumption profiles also affects simulations in a 
disproportionate way and may artificially inflate some simulation results. Although the Monte 
Carlo method somewhat minimizes the impact of a lognormal distribution, research with larger 
data sets might provide new insights. The simplicity in agents used also led to a lack of a better 
proxy to determine influence of smart meters, where more advanced data might have been 
used. Lastly, in the interest of simplicity, no storage capabilities or outside uses for electricity 
such as electric vehicle charging were considered. Integration of consumer decisions on a more 
macro level should therefore be present on subsequent research.  
 
5.3 CONTRIBUTIONS AND FURTHER RESEARCH 
At an academic level, this study strived to contribute to a better understanding of local 
energy market functioning and management by focusing on achievable utility and related 
electricity prices. In doing so, insights were provided on current trends in the renewable energy 
sector, the impacts associated with the prosumer movement and various methods of demand 
side management in the context of smart grids. It also provided a general overview of 
Blockchain technology functioning, its integration with other IoT mechanisms and context 
specific strengths and weaknesses in the scope of renewables.  
On a managerial level, it opens the door for further, more in depth studies into how to 
develop business models to tackle this unfilled market segment in a profitable manner. The 
analysis of currently implemented projects served to provide an overview of management 
techniques and market design approaches. The importance of big data and prediction tools, as 
well as IoT when developing these Blockchain applications was also highlighted. Quantitative 
analysis provided a starting point when setting up local energy markets by offering guidelines 
on market size and structure, although context-specific applications may require some degree 
of adaptations. 
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Due to the recent emergence of self-consumption movements and the novelty of 
Blockchain integration in smart meters, various fields are open for further research. One such 
topic should focus on macro scale modeling of changes in the sector and further quantification 
of impacts important to help predict the innovation path. It should seek to gain added 
knowledge into the factors and conditions that affect individual and market-wide surplus 
creation and capture. Prolonged and continuous discussion on the advantages provided by P2P 
electricity exchanges is also necessary, as the field is far from consolidated. This study also 
included a simplified auction mechanism which should be extended to account for different 
agent behavior and exogenous factors. The opportunity to harness the benefits of economies of 
scale by interconnecting various microgrids is also worthy of further research. Furthermore, a 
more complete set of costs should be analyzed and modeled towards. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 50 
 
6. References 
 
Agrawal, A.; Cockburn, I. & Zhang, L. (2015). Deals not done: Sources of failure in the 
market for ideas. Strategic management journal, 36(7), 976-986. 
https://doi.org/10.1002/smj.2261 
Aguirre, M. & Ibikunle, G. (2014). Determinants of renewable energy growth: A global 
sample analysis. Energy Policy, 69, 374–384. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.enpol.2014.02.036 
American Physical Society (2011). Integrating Renewable Electricity on the Grid. A Report 
by the APS Panel on Public Affairs. American Physical Society, Washington DC, 36p. 
Retrieved November 25, 2017 from https://www.aps.org/policy/reports/popa-
reports/upload/integratingelec.pdf 
Akbarpour, M.; Li, S. & Gharan, S. (2014). Dynamic matching market design. arXiv preprint 
arXiv:1402.3643 
Anufriev, M., Arifovic, J., Ledyard, J., & Panchenko, V. (2013). Efficiency of continuous 
double auctions under individual evolutionary learning with full or limited information. 
Journal of Evolutionary Economics, 23(3), 539-573. https://doi.org/10.1007/s00191-
011-0230-8 
Asmus, P. (2010). Microgrids, Virtual Power Plants and Our Distributed Energy Future. The 
Electricity Journal, 23(10), 72–82. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tej.2010.11.001 
Basden, J. & Cottrell, M. (2017). How Utilities Are Using Blockchain to Modernize the Grid. 
Harvard Business Review Digital Articles, 2–5. Retrieved from 
http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=bth&AN=122087645&lang=pt-
br&site=eds-live&authtype=uid 
Bernardon, D.; Mello, A.; Pfitscher, L.; Canha, L.; Abaide, A. & Ferreira, A. (2014). Real-
time reconfiguration of distribution network with distributed generation. Electric Power 
Systems Research, 107, 59–67. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.epsr.2013.09.011 
Bichler, M.; Gupta, A. & Ketter, W. (2010). Designing smart markets. Information Systems 
Research, 21(4), 688–699. https://doi.org/10.1287/isre.1100.0316 
Block, C.; Neumann, D. & Weinhardt, C. (2008). A market mechanism for energy allocation 
in micro-CHP grids. In Proceedings of the Annual Hawaii International Conference on 
System Sciences. https://doi.org/10.1109/HICSS.2008.27 
Blockgeeks (2016). What is Blockchain Technology? A Step-by-Step Guide For Beginners. 
Retrieved October 9, 2017 from https://blockgeeks.com/guides/what-is-blockchain-
technology/ 
Bloomberg New Energy Finance (2017). Clean energy investment – 2Q 2017 figures. 
Retrieved November 2, 2017 from https://about.bnef.com/blog/clean-energy-
investment-2q-2017-figures-2/ 
 51 
 
Bohne, E. (2011). Conflicts between national regulatory cultures and EU energy regulations. 
Utilities Policy, 19(4), 255–269. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jup.2011.05.003 
Bohnsack, R.; Pinkse, J. & Waelpoel, A. (2016). The institutional evolution process of the 
global solar industry: The role of public and private actors in creating institutional shifts. 
Environmental Innovation and Societal Transitions, 20, 16-32. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.eist.2015.10.006 
Bosco, B., Parisio, L. & Pelagatti, M. (2016). Price Coordination in Vertically Integrated 
Electricity Markets Theory and Empirical Evidence, 37(1), 181–195. 
https://doi.org/10.5547/01956574.37.1.bbos 
Breu, F.; Guggenbichler, S. & Wollmann, J. (2008). Wind and Solar Power Systems: Design, 
Analysis, and Operation. Vasa, 87–101. https://doi.org/10.1002/1521-
3773(20010316)40:6<9823::AID-ANIE9823>3.3.CO;2-C 
Brusco, G.; Burgio, A.; Menniti, D.; Pinnarelli, A. & Sorrentino, N. (2014). Energy 
Management System for an Energy District With Demand Response Availability, IEEE 
Transactions on Smart Grid, 5(5), 1–9. 
Chaffey, D. (2009). E-Business and E-Commerce Management - Strategy, Implementation 
and Practice. Practice. https://doi.org/http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/B978-008044910-
4.00148-6 
Cramton, P. (2004). Competitive bidding behavior in uniform-price auction markets. 
Proceedings of the 37th Annual Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences, 
(C), 11 pp. https://doi.org/10.1109/HICSS.2004.1265172 
Cryptocoinsnews (2016). PwC Expert: $1.4 Billion Invested in Blockchain in 2016. Retrieved 
November 2, 2017 from https://www.cryptocoinsnews.com/pwc-expert-1-4-billion-
invested-blockchain-2016/ 
Darghouth, N.; Barbose, G. & Wiser, R. H. (2014). Customer-economics of residential 
photovoltaic systems ( Part 1 ): The impact of high renewable energy penetrations on 
electricity bill savings with net metering. Energy Policy, 67, 290-300. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.enpol.2013.12.042 
Delucchi, M. & Jacobson, M. (2011). Providing all global energy with wind, water, and solar 
power, Part II: Reliability, system and transmission costs, and policies. Energy Policy, 
39(3), 1170–1190. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.enpol.2010.11.045 
Dishaw, M. & Strong, D. (1999). Extending the technology acceptance model with task–
technology fit constructs. Information & Management, 36(1), 9–21. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/S0378-7206(98)00101-3 
EC (2016). Commission Staff Working Document Impact Assessment. Retrieved September 
14, 2017 from 
https://ec.europa.eu/energy/sites/ener/files/documents/mdi_impact_assessment_main_re
port_for_publication.pdf 
 52 
 
Eid, C.; Reneses, J.; Frías, P. & Hakvoort, R. (2014). The economic effect of electricity net-
metering with solar PV : Consequences for network cost recovery , cross subsidies and 
policy objectives. Energy Policy, 75, 244-254. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.enpol.2014.09.011 
Ellabban, O., Abu-Rub, H. & Blaabjerg, F. (2014). Renewable energy resources: Current 
status, future prospects and their enabling technology. Renewable and Sustainable 
Energy Reviews, 39, 748–764. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.rser.2014.07.113 
Eurostat (2017a). Energy consumption in households. Eurostat Statistics Explained. 
Retrieved October 22, 2017 from http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-
explained/index.php/Energy_consumption_in_households 
Eurostat (2017b). Electricity price statistics. Eurostat Statistics Explained. Retrieved 
November 7, 2017 from http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-
explained/index.php/Electricity_price_statistics 
Farmer, J.; Patelli, P. & Zovko, I. (2005). The predictive power of zero intelligence in 
financial markets. Proceedings of the national academy of sciences of the United States 
of America, 102(6), 2254-2259. https://doi:10.1073/pnas.0409157102 
Gode, D. & Sunder, S. (1993). Allocative efficiency of markets with zero-intelligence 
traders: Market as a partial substitute for individual rationality. Journal of political 
economy, 101(1), 119-137. https://doi.org/10.1086/261868 
Haruvy, E. & Popkowski Leszczyc, P. (2016). Measuring the Impact of Price Guarantees on 
Bidding in Consumer Online Auctions. Journal of Retailing, 92(1), 96–108. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jretai.2015.07.003 
Huang, W.; Lu, M. & Zhang, L. (2011). Survey on microgrid control strategies. In Energy 
Procedia, 12, 206–212. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.egypro.2011.10.029 
Huh, S.; Cho, S. & Kim, S. (2017). Managing IoT devices using blockchain platform. 2017 
19th International Conference on Advanced Communication Technology (ICACT), 464–
467. https://doi.org/10.23919/ICACT.2017.7890132 
Iowa Environmental Mesonet, Iowa State University. Retrieved January 29, 2018 from 
https://mesonet.agron.iastate.edu/ 
Jarvenpaa, L.; Lintinen, M.; Mattila, A.; Mikkonen, T.; Systa, K. & Voutilainen, J. (2013). 
Mobile agents for the internet of things. In System Theory, Control and Computing 
(ICSTCC), 2013 17th International Conference, IEEE, 763-767. 
https://doi.org/10.1109/ICSTCC.2013.6689053 
Jones-Albertus, R.; Feldman, D.; Fu, R.; Horowitz, K. & Woodhouse, M. (2016). Technology 
advances needed for photovoltaics to achieve widespread grid price parity. Progress in 
Photovoltaics: Research and Applications, 24(9), 1272–1283. 
https://doi.org/10.1002/pip.2755 
 
 53 
 
Karakaya, E.; Hidalgo, A. & Nuur, C. (2015). Motivators for adoption of photovoltaic 
systems at grid parity: A case study from Southern Germany. Renewable and 
Sustainable Energy Reviews, 43, 1090–1098. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.rser.2014.11.077 
Karnouskos, S. (2011). Demand Side Management via prosumer interactions in a smart city 
energy marketplace. IEEE PES Innovative Smart Grid Technologies Conference 
Europe, 1–7. https://doi.org/10.1109/ISGTEurope.2011.6162818 
Keppler, J.; Phan, S.; Le Pen, Y. & Boureau, C. (2017). The Impact of Intermittent 
Renewable Production and Market Coupling on the Convergence of French and German 
Electricity Prices. hal-01599700.  
https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/7af8/e06abb8d9b385f7a52803dddb5769c058098.pdf 
Kriett, P. & Salani, M. (2012). Optimal control of a residential microgrid. Energy, 42(1), 
321–330. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.energy.2012.03.049 
Lamparter, S.; Becher, S. & Fischer, J. (2010). An Agent-based Market Platform for Smart 
Grids. In Proc. 9th Int. Conf. Auton. Agents Multiagent Syst., 1689–1696. 
LeBaron, Blake (2000) Agent-based computational finance: Suggested readings and early 
research. Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, 24(5-7), 679-702. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/S0165-1889(99)00022-6 
Liu, Z.; Zhang, X.; & Lieu, J. (2010). Design of the incentive mechanism in electricity 
auction market based on the signaling game theory. Energy, 35(4), 1813-1819. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.energy.2009.12.036 
MacKie-Mason, J. & Wellman, M. (2006). Chapter 28 Automated Markets and Trading 
Agents. Handbook of Computational Economics, 2, 1381-1431. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/S1574-0021(05)02028-9 
Mahmoud, M.; Azher Hussain, S. & Abido, M. (2014). Modeling and control of microgrid: 
An overview. Journal of the Franklin Institute, 351(5), 2822–2859. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfranklin.2014.01.016 
Masson, G.; Orlandi, S.; Petrick, K.; Cassagne, V.; Briano, J.; Morandi, Maria, J. B.; … 
Rickerson, W. (2014). PV development as prosumers: the role and challenges associated 
to producing and self-consuming PV electricity. In Proc. of the 4th International 
Workshop on Integration of Solar Power into Power Systems. 1-12. 
McKerracher, C. & Torriti, J. (2013). Energy consumption feedback in perspective: 
Integrating Australian data to meta-analyses on in-home displays. Energy Efficiency, 
6(2), 387-405. https://doi.org/10.1007/s12053-012-9169-3 
Mengelkamp, E.; Gärttner, J.;Rock, K.; Kessler, S.; Orsini, L. & Weinhardt, C. (2017). 
Designing microgrid energy markets. A case study: The Brooklyn Microgrid. Applied 
Energy, 210(15) 870-880. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.apenergy.2017.06.054 
 
 54 
 
Mengelkamp, E.; Notheisen, B.; Beer, C.; Dauer, D. & Weinhardt, C. (2017). A blockchain-
based smart grid: towards sustainable local energy markets. Computer Science - 
Research and Development, 33(1-2), 207-214. https://doi.org/10.1007/s00450-017-
0360-9 
Muralitharan, K.; Sakthivel, R. & Shi, Y. (2016). Multiobjective optimization technique for 
demand side management with load balancing approach in smart grid. Neurocomputing, 
177, 110–119. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.neucom.2015.11.015 
Nakamoto, S. (2008). Bitcoin: A peer-to-peer electronic cash system. Retrieved October 4, 
2017 from https://bitcoin.org/bitcoin.pdf 
National Bureau of Economic Research, Market Design (MD) Retrieved March 8, 2018 from 
http://www.nber.org/workinggroups/md/md.html 
Olivares, D.; Mehrizi-Sani, A.; Etemadi, A.; Cañizares, C.; Iravani, R.; Kazerani, M.; … 
Hatziargyriou, N. D. (2014). Trends in microgrid control. IEEE Transactions on Smart 
Grid, 5(4), 1905–1919. https://doi.org/10.1109/TSG.2013.2295514 
Omohundro, S. (2014). Cryptocurrencies, smart contracts, and artificial intelligence. AI 
Matters, 1(2), 19–21. https://doi.org/10.1145/2685328.2685334 
Ossenbrink, J. (2017). How feed-in remuneration design shapes residential PV prosumer 
paradigms. Energy Policy, 108, 239–255. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.enpol.2017.05.030 
Parag, Y. & Sovacool, B. K. (2016). Electricity market design for the prosumer era. Nature 
Energy, 1(4), 16032, 1-6. https://doi.org/10.1038/nenergy.2016.32 
Pecan Street Inc. Dataport 2017. Retrieved November 27, 2017 from 
https://dataport.cloud/data/database 
Pisano, G. (2015). You need an innovation strategy. Harvard Business Review, 93(6), 44-54. 
Retrieved March 8, 2018 from 
http://cegllcstrategies.com/pdfs/You_Need_an_%20Innovation_Strategy_5.pdf 
PONTON (2017). Enerchain P2P Trading Project. Retrieved November 6, 2017 from 
https://enerchain.ponton.de/index.php/21-enerchain-p2p-trading-project 
Prabavathi, M. & Gnanadass, R. (2015). Energy bidding strategies for restructured electricity 
market. International Journal of Electrical Power and Energy Systems, 64, 956–966. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijepes.2014.08.018 
Rai, V. & Robinson, S. (2015). Agent-based modeling of energy technology adoption: 
Empirical integration of social, behavioral, economic, and environmental factors. 
Environmental Modelling & Software, 70, 163–177. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.envsoft.2015.04.014 
Residential Monthly kWh and Bills, Retrieved February 6, 2018 from 
https://data.austintexas.gov/Utilities-and-City-Services/Residential-Average-Monthly-
kWh-and-Bills/d9pb-3vh7 
 55 
 
Ritzer, G. (2010). Focusing on the Prosumer. On Correcting an Error in the History of Social 
Theory. In Blättel-Mink B., Hellmann KU. (eds) Prosumer Revisited. VS Verlag für 
Sozialwissenschaften, 61–79. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-531-91998-0_3 
Sawilowsky, S. (2009). New effect size rules of thumb. Journal of Modern Applied Statistical 
Methods, 8(2), 597 – 599. Retrieved  January 11, 2018 from 
https://digitalcommons.wayne.edu/coe_tbf/4/ 
Schulz, K. & Grimes, D. (2005). Sample size calculations in randomised trials: Mandatory 
and mystical. Lancet, 365(9467), 1348–1353. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0140-
6736(05)61034-3 
Shrouf, F.; Ordieres, J. & Miragliotta, G. (2014). Smart factories in Industry 4.0: A review of 
the concept and of energy management approached in production based on the Internet 
of Things paradigm. IEEE International Conference on Industrial Engineering and 
Engineering Management, 2015–Janua, 697–701. 
https://doi.org/10.1109/IEEM.2014.7058728 
Spanò, E.; Niccolini, L.; Di Pascoli, S. & Iannaccone, G. (2015). Last-meter smart grid 
embedded in an internet-of-things platform. IEEE Transactions on Smart Grid, 6(1), 
468–476. https://doi.org/10.1109/TSG.2014.2342796 
Su, W. & Wang, J. (2012). Energy Management Systems in Microgrid Operations. Electricity 
Journal, 25(8), 45–60. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tej.2012.09.010 
Surendran, P. (2012). Technology Acceptance Model : A Survey of Literature. International 
Journal of Business and Social Research, 2(4), 175–178. 
https://doi.org/http://dx.doi.org/10.18533/ijbsr.v2i4.161 
Tampakis, S.; Tsantopoulos, G.; Arabatzis, G. & Rerras, I. (2013). Citizens’ views on various 
forms of energy and their contribution to the environment. Renewable and Sustainable 
Energy Reviews, 20, 473–482. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.rser.2012.12.027 
The Weather Channel. Winter Storm Vexo, Major April Snowstorm, Pounds the Rockies, 
High Plains (RECAP) Retrieved January 29, 2018 from 
https://weather.com/storms/winter/news/winter-storm-vexo-rockies-high-plains-denver-
snowstorm-april-2016 
Timilsina, G.; Kurdgelashvili, L. & Narbel, P. (2012). Solar energy: Markets, economics and 
policies. Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews, 16(1), 449–465. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.rser.2011.08.009 
Toffler, A. (1980). The third wave (Vol. 484). New York: Bantam books. 
Toppenberg, G.; Henningsson, S. & Eaton, B. (2016). Reinventing the Platform Core 
Through Acquisition: A Case Study. In System Sciences (HICSS), 2016 49th Hawaii 
International Conference on, IEEE, 4634-4643. 
https://doi.org/10.1109/HICSS.2016.575 
 
 56 
 
U.S. EIA (2017). International Energy Outlook 2017. U.S Energy Information 
Administration, #IEO2017, 151p. Retrieved October 23, 2017 from 
https://www.eia.gov/outlooks/ieo/pdf/0484(2017).pdf  
Van Alstyne, M. W., Parker, G. G., & Choudary, S. P. (2016). Pipelines, platforms, and the 
new rules of strategy. Harvard Business Review, 94(4), 54-62. ISSN 0017-8012 
Vytelingum, P.; Ramchurn, S.; Voice, T.; Rogers, A. & Jennings, N. R. (2010). Trading 
agents for the smart electricity grid. 9th International Conference on AAMAS 2010, 
897–904. Retrieved from http://eprints.soton.ac.uk/268361/ 
Walker, G. & Cass, N. (2007). Carbon reduction, “the public” and renewable energy: 
Engaging with socio-technical configurations. Area, 39(4), 458–469. 
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1475-4762.2007.00772.x 
Wang, W.; Xu, Y. & Khanna, M. (2011). A survey on the communication architectures in 
smart grid. Computer Networks, 55(15), 3604–3629. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.comnet.2011.07.010 
Watson, J.; Sauter, R.; Bahaj, A.; James, P.; Myers, L. & Wing, R. (2006). Unlocking the 
power house: policy and system change for domestic micro-generation in the UK. 
University of Sussex, Social Policy Research Unit 32p. https://doi.org/ISBN 1-903721-
02-4 
Widén, J.; Wäckelgård, E. & Lund, P. (2009). Options for improving the load matching 
capability of distributed photovoltaics: Methodology and application to high-latitude 
data. Solar Energy, 83(11), 1953–1966. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.solener.2009.07.007 
Wilson, R. (2002). Architecture of power markets. Econometrica, 70(4), 1299-1340. 
https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-0262.00334 
Wolske, K.; Stern, P. & Dietz, T. (2017). Explaining interest in adopting residential solar 
photovoltaic systems in the United States: Toward an integration of behavioral theories. 
Energy Research and Social Science, 25, 134–151. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.erss.2016.12.023 
World Temperatures — Weather Around The World, Past Weather in Austin, Texas. 
Retrieved January 29, 2018 from https://www.timeanddate.com/weather/usa/austin 
WorldBank (2015a). Fossil fuel energy consumption (% of total). The World Bank Group 
Data. Retrieved September 7, 2017 from 
https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/EG.USE.COMM.FO.ZS?end=2014&start=1960 
WorldBank (2015b) Renewable energy consumption (% of total final energy consumption). 
The World Bank Group Data. Retrieved September 8, 2017 from 
https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/EG.FEC.RNEW.ZS?view=chart 
Yamamoto, Y. (2012). Pricing electricity from residential photovoltaic systems: A 
comparison of feed-in tariffs, net metering, and net purchase and sale. Solar Energy, 
86(9), 2678–2685. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.solener.2012.06.001 
 57 
 
 
 
 
